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Accrual of Gambling Debts Under Internal Revenue 
Code Section 451 
Section 451(a) of the Internal Revenue Code generally requires 
that income be reported in the tax year in which it is accounted for 
under the taxpayer's method of financial accounting.1 As Congress 
may have recognized,2 however, the objectives of financial account-
ing and tax accounting cliffer3 and often yield divergent results.4 To 
promote a principal goal of tax accounting - ensuring that the tax-
1. I.R.C. § 45l(a). See also I.R.C. § 446(a). The rule is expressly limited to cases where 
the IRS determines that the accounts clearly reflect income. I.R.C. § 446(b). See Thor Power 
Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 541 (1979) (quoting Lucas v. American Code Co., 
280 U.S. 445, 449 (1930)). 
2. While § 446(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that "(t]axable income shall be 
computed' under the method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly com-
putes his income in keeping his books," Congress created an exception when the taxpayer's 
method "does not clearly reflect income." I.R.C. § 446(b). See note 5 infra. 
3. "[T]he characterization of a transaction for financial accounting purposes, on the one 
hand, and for tax purposes, on the other, need not necessarily be the same." Frank Lyon Co. 
v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 577 (1978). ''Tax accounting is not, and is not intended to be, 
the same as other accounting." G. HILLS, LAW OF ACCOUNTING 48 (1957). 
Financial and tax accounting have distinct goals. The goal of financial accounting is to 
provide accurate financial information useful for decision-making by managers, investors, and 
creditors. Healy, Narrowing the Gap Between Tax and Financial Accounting, 22 TUL, TAX 
INST. 407,414 (1973). ''The primary goal of the income tax system, in contrast, is the equitable 
collection of revenue; the major responsibility of the Internal Revenue Service is to protect the 
public fisc." Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 542 (1979). See generally 
Statement of the National Association of Manufacturer's Subcommittee on Tax Revision 
(Aug. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Manufacturer's Statement], reprinted in B. BITTKER & L. 
STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1009 (5th ed. 1980). 
Owing to the importance of accurate financial statements, financial accounting principles 
provide that errors in income measurement should be in the direction of understatement. See 
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUN· 
TANTS, STATEMENT No. 4, BASIC CONCEPTS AND ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING FI-
NANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES ~ 171 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD], reprinted in FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, 
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD & COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTING PROCEDURE, FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 437,469 (1978). On the expense side, financial accounting encour-
ages the use of estimates, probabilities and reasonable certainties. Thor Power Tool Co. v. 
Commissioner, 439 U.S. at 543. The IRS, on the other hand, conscious of its primary responsi-
bility to protect the public fisc, cannot be satisfied with understatements and uncertainty. 439 
U.S. at 542-43. For example, the financial accountant often sets up reserves to cover contin-
gent liabilities, but because of their uncertainty, these reserves are not deductible. See, e.g., 
Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 452 (1930). 
4. First, differences arise from Code provisions under which specified revenues are exempt 
from taxation and specified expenses are not allowable as deductions in computing taxable 
income. R. WIXON, W. KELL & N. BEDFORD, ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK § 6.10 (5th ed. 
1970); Manufacturer's Statement, supra note 3. 
Second, and most important in this case, tax accounting often fails to match income and 
expenses properly. See, e.g., American Automobile Assn. v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 690-
92 (1961) (a taxpayer must recognize prepaid income when received, even though this would 
mismatch expenses and income in contravention of generally accepted accounting principles); 
334 
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payer's method "clearly reflect[s] income"5 - the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) has promulgated regulations to guide a taxpayer's use 
of different accounting methods. Thus, for the accrual taxpayer, reg-
ulation 1.451-1 requires inclusion in gross income ''when all the 
events have occurred which fix the right to receive such income and 
the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy."6 
This regulation, known as the "all events test,"7 has created an 
interpretive difficulty when applied to casinos using the accrual 
method of accounting. The IRS contends that these businesses must 
report outstanding gambling "markers" - essentially counterchecks 
for the amount of the chips transferred to a patron8 - as taxable 
income in the year the markers are executed. The Nevada District 
Court has agreed with the IRS9 that casinos will almost certainly 
collect the outstanding debts and should therefore accrue them as 
income.Io The Tax Court, however, has held that regulation 1.451-1 
does not require inclusion of outstanding markers in taxable income 
because they are not legally enforceable. I 1 In contrast to the IRS, 
Guardian Inv. Corp. v. Phinney, 253 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1958); Eastman Kodak Co. v. United 
States, 534 F.2d 252 (Ct. Cl. 1976). 
For tax purposes, an item need not be included as income in the year in which the expenses 
that generated it were deducted. Breeze Corps. v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 404, 407 (Ct. Cl. 
1954); Globe Corp. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 299, 304-05 (1953); Foster Wheeler Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 20 T.C. 15, 19 (1953). Moreover, because the income tax laws operate on an 
annual basis, a complete correlation of income and related deductions is unlikely. See Guard-
ian Inv. Corp. v. Phinney, 253 F.2d at 329; Marquardt Corp. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 443, 
453 (1962); Drazen v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 1070, 1078 (1960); Comment, Accrual· The Un-
certain Concept of Certainty-A History of the All Events Test, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 293,294 
(1954) ("One of the rules contributing to the ease of administration of tax accounting is that 
'contingent' receipts or expenses, though perhaps properly accrued by business accounting 
standards, are not includable in income tax calculations."). See generally Kupfer, The Finan-
cial Accounting Disclosure of Tax Matters; Co,iflicts with Tax Accounting Technical Require-
ments, 33 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1121 (1975). 
5. See I.R.C. § 446(b), which provides that if the taxpayer's method of financial accounting 
"does not clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable income shall be made under such 
method as, in the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect income." 
6. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-l(a) (1957). 
1. See Comment, supra note 4, at 293. 
8. Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States, 485 F. Supp. 926, 928 (D. Nev. 1980). 
9. 485 F. Supp. at 929. 
10. See Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States, 485 F. Supp. 926 (D. Nev. 1980). But see 
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1033 (1979). 
The issues involved in this Note may also be applicable to casino operators in New Jersey. 
At one time, all gambling transactions were unlawful in New Jersey. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:40-
l. Obligations arising out of gambling transactions were void. N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:40-3. 
See Schwartz v. Battifarano, 2 N.J. 478, 483, 67 A.2d 148, 151 (1949). In 1977, following a 
statewide referendum, the New Jersey legislature legalized gambling in Atlantic City. N.J. 
STAT. ANN.§ 5.12-1 (West Supp. 1981). Although the statute specifically exempted Atlantic 
City gambling from the provisions of§ 2A:40-l, no mention was made of§ 2A:40-3. N.J. 
STAT. ANN.§ 5.12-124 (West Supp. 1981). Presumably, gambling debts are still void, even in 
Atlantic City. As of yet, no cases have addressed this issue. 
11. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1033 (1979). Although Nevada has legal-
ized gambling, the courts consider gambling on credit to be contrary to public policy. See 
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which stresses the certainty of eventual collection, the Tax Court and 
casinos argue that accrual of income depends on the legal enforce-
ability of the item in question. They conclude that income should 
not be reported until the markers are collected. 
This Note examines whether an accrual-basis taxpayer must in-
clude a legally unenforceable claim in taxable income when it is exe-
cuted or satisfied. Section I of the Note interprets the "all events 
test" to require measurement of the likelihood of payment of a debt 
at the time it is executed: If payment is sufficiently certain, the debt 
must be accrued. The section concludes that the casinos must in-
clude the outstanding markers as income in the year of their execu-
tion, and cannot postpone their inclusion until the debts are repaid. 12 
Section II argues that accrual-method taxpayers are entitled to use a 
"bad debt reserve" to deduct unenforceable debts that may prove 
uncollectible. 
I. INTERPRETING THE "ALL EVENTS TEST" 
Generally, the Internal Revenue Code requires taxpayers to re-
port gross income in the tax year in which it is "properly accounted 
for" under the taxpayer's method of financial accounting. 13 Since a 
casino using generally accepted accounting principles must accrue in 
income its outstanding markers, less a reserve for doubtful ac-
counts, 14 the Code appears to require inclusion of the markers in 
Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States, 485 F. Supp. 926, 938 (D. Nev. 1980). The Nevada 
Supreme Court has held that the English anti-gambling statute-The Gaming Act, 1710, 8-12 
Anne, c. 14, § I - is part of Nevada law. The courts will not enforce a gambling debt if the 
debtor pleads and proves, in some instances with the aid of a presumption, that the debt arose 
out of a gambling transaction. See Corbin v. O'Keefe, 87 Nev. 189, 484 P.2d 565 (1971) (per 
curiam); Wolpert v. Knight, 74 Nev. 322, 330 P.2d 1023 (1958); Weisbrod v. Fremont Hotel, 
Inc., 74 Nev. 227, 326 P.2d I 104 (1958) (per curiam); West Indies, Inc. v. First Natl. Banlc, 67 
Nev. 13, 214 P.2d 144 (1950); Craig v. Harrah, 66 Nev. I, 201 P.2d 1081 (1949). Casinos may 
collect outstanding markers only if the patron pays voluntarily or fails to assert the "gambling 
purposes" defense. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. at 1043. 
This Note is concerned only with credit that casinos extend to patrons for gambling pur-
poses. It applies to all loans at the gambling tables. When the transaction occurs at the cash-
ier's cage, however, the chips are not necessarily used for gambling. Patrons may also use 
them to purchase drinks, foods, or merchandise. Markers executed for these purposes are 
legally enforceable and do not raise the issues involved in this Note. See generally Desert 
Palace, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1033 (1979). 
12. The parties' divergent interests result from the time value of money. It is well recog-
nized that 
[T]he heart of many tax cases is the issue of whether the tax should be paid sooner or 
later, it being conceded that a tax is due. Generally taxpayers prefer to postpone the 
recognition of taxable income and payment of tax as long as possible while the Treasury 
wishes to accelerate payment, since a tax deferred is a loss of immediate revenue. The 
desire by taxpayers to postpone the payment of taxes arises mainly from two factors -
interest and inflation. The use of a dollar for another period of time results in additional 
monies to the taxpayer. 
B. BITIKER & L. STONE, supra note 3, at 1007. 
13. See note I supra. 
14. See Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States, 485 F. Supp. 926, 929 (D. Nev. 1980); 
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taxable income as well. 15 To justify not reporting markers until the 
year of collection, the casinos rely on treasury regulation 1.451-1, 
which provides for accrual of taxable income when the taxpayer's 
right to receive such income becomes fixed. 16 They argue that the 
regulation's language only permits accrual of claims that are legally 
enforceable.17 As the analysis below indicates, the argument is 
flawed. 
In applying the "all events test," courts must initially18 determine 
the existence of a fixed right to receive the income in question, 19 a 
task that has precipitated some confusion. 20 A "right," commonly 
understood, "connotes an ascertainable and legally enforceable 
power."21 Applying this definition, an unenforceable gambling 
claim could not conceivably be a "fixed right." But some courts 
have used "right" as a synonym for "claim"22 and common-law 
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1033, 1044, 1046 (1979). The goal of financial 
accounting is to match current revenues with current costs. ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, 
supra note 3, at~ 11; G. JOHNSON & J. GENTRY, FINNEY AND MILLER'S PRINCIPLES OF AC-
COUNTING, INTRODUCTION 27 (7th ed. 1970). See also R. WIXON, w. KELL & N. BEDFORD, 
supra note 4, at § 6.12 ("Without adjustment for accruals,jinancial statements prepared from 
books kept on a cash basis usually do not tend to show fairly, in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles, the financial position of an enterprise.") ( emphasis in original). 
15. If the casino did not accrue the outstanding markers in its financial statements, the IRS 
could, "in the exercise ofits discretion," require accrual in the casino's tax return. Thor Power 
Tool Co. v.' Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522,540 (1979). See, e.g., American Automobile Assn. v. 
United States, 367 U.S. 687, 692 (1961). 
16. See note 6 supra. 
17. See Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States, 485 F. Supp. 926, 929 (D. Nev. 1980); 
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1033, 1048 (1979). 
18. In the case of outstanding markers held by a gambling casino, there is no doubt that 
the amount can be determined with reasonable accuracy: "Each marker is for a specific dollar 
amount and there are no contingencies. that could alter the amount of the obligation." 485 F. 
Supp. at 931. 
19. "[l]t is the right to receive and not the actual receipt that determines the inclusion of an 
amount in gross income." Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 184 (1934) 
(emphasis in original). 
20. See Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States, 485 F. Supp. at 933. 
21. United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 136 (1972). 
22. See Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 758 (D. Conn. 
1935); Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 38 F. 55, 56 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1889); In re Estate of 
Wynn, 311 ill. App. 190, 196, 35 N.E.2d 702, 705 (1941); Hathorn v. Robinson, 98 Me. 334, 
341, 56 A. 1057, 1059 (1903); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Borough Bank, 161 App. 
Div. 479, 487-88, 146 N.Y.S. 870, 876, ajfd, 213 N.Y. 628, 107 N.E. 1086 (1914); Ex parte 
Bailey, 20 Okla. 497, 501, 94 P. 553, 554 (1908); Alamo Dev. Corp. v. Thomas, 186 Tenn. 631, 
639, 212 S.W.2d 606, 610 (1948). 
The word ''right," . . . is a common term of broad signification. It is a generic, ab-
stract, and comprehensive term, having a wide scope of meaning in its various legal appli-
cations, and it has no satisfactory definition or explanation except in connection with 
some concrete conception of the thing out of which it grows. 
77 C.J.S. Right (1952) (footnotes omitted). See Clark v. Sweet, 187 Neb. 232, 234, 188 N.W.2d 
889, 890-91 (1971); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Borough Bank, 161 App. Div. 479, 
487-88, 146 N.Y.S. 870, 876 (1914), ajfd, 213 N.Y. 628, 107 N.E. 1086 (1914); Hampton v. 
North Carolina Pulp Co., 223 N.C. 535, 546, 27 S.E.2d 538, 545 (1943). 
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cases qualified the term, using "unconditional" right,23 "enforcea-
ble" right, 24 and other phrases25 to conceptualize accrual for tax ac-
counting purposes. To interpret their use of "right" to connote legal 
enforceability would read redundancy into these phrases. A more 
plausible construction of the term equates "right" with "claim."26 
Applying this interpretation of the term to the "all events test" 
would more fully promote congressional policy than a construction 
requiring legal enforceability. First, a legal enforceability standard 
would undermine the purpose of the "all events test": to ensure ac-
crual in taxable income of all income earned within a given year, 
even if payment has not yet been received.27 If the refusal of courts 
to enforce claims can thwart the accrual of income for tax account-
ing purposes, the income that a taxpayer reports may not accurately 
reflect income that it has earned within the tax year and treated as 
earnings for financial accounting purposes.28 The legal enforceabil-
ity standard would also facilitate manipulation of tax liability.29 If 
instead the IRS ascertained the probability of eventual payment, the 
agency would better ensure that reported income fully reflects in-
come that is earned. 30 
Second, the legal enforceability standard frustrates the funda-
mental tax policy requiring similarly situated taxpayers to pay the 
same tax.31 The Internal Revenue Code defines gross income for tax 
accounting purposes as "all income from whatever source de-
rived."32 Courts have interpreted this all-inclusive definition to 
mean that ~come received from an unlawful business or transaction 
23. Lucas v. North Tex. Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11, 13 (1930). 
24. Breeze Corps. v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 404, 407 (Ct. Cl. 1954). 
25. See Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States, 485 F. Supp. at 932 (citing Continental 
Tie & Lumber Co. v. United States, 286 U.S. 290, 295 (1932) ("right to payment"); Spring 
City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 184 (1934) ("fixed right to receive"); 
Lictenberger-Ferguson Co. v. Welch, 54 F.2d 570,572 (9th Cir. 1931) ("definitely ascertained 
as to its amount, and acknowledged to be due")). 
26. See Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 184-85 (1934) (using 
"right" and "claim" interchangeably in applying the "all events test."). 
21. See Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 466-67 (1959); Helvering v. Enright, 312 
U.S. 636, 645 (1941). 
28. The casinos treat the outstanding markers as income for financial accounting purposes. 
Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States, 485 F. Supp. at 929; Desert Palace, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 72 T.C. at 1044. 
29. For example, the taxpayer could manipulate income recognition simply by not pursu-
ing his claim in court. q. Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 467 (1959) (''To permit 
accrual basis taxpayers to escape accrual and taxation, in a particular year, of such portion of 
their sales as they may permit to be retained by buyers . • • might well afford opportunities to 
accrual basis taxpayers to allocate income to years deemed most advantageous."). 
30. In this way, the IRS discharges its primary responsiblility to preserve the public reve-
nue. See Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 542 (1979). See generally 
Manufacturer's Statement, supra note 3. 
31. See Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. at 544. 
32. I.R.C. § 61. 
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is taxable at the same rate as other sources ofincome.33 This policy's 
application to the accrual of gambling markers raises a compelling 
argument: The tax laws should not enable casinos to gain an unfair 
preference over other businesses34 merely because they extend credit 
unlawfully.35 
Taxpayers who oppose accrual of gambling markers in the year 
of execution might rely on cases that seem to demand a level of cer-
tainty even greater than a legal enforceability test would require.36 
In Lucas v. North Texas Lumber Co., the Supreme Court held that a 
vendor could not accrue income until there was "unconditional lia-
bility" on the purchaser's part.37 The taxpayer had sought to avoid 
its increased tax liability by accruing income in the year preceding a 
tax rate increase. In taking the unusual position38 that the taxpayer 
must postpone income recognition, the IRS argued that normal 
financial accrual principles requiring accrual in the earlier year were 
inapplicable to accrual of income for tax purposes. The IRS analo-
gized to United States v. Anderson,39 which had set forth the test for 
accrual of deductions. Given :financial accounting's reliance on esti-
mates in calculating expenses, the Supreme Court had recognized 
the importance of a rule of certainty for tax purposes to assure that 
33. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966). See, e.g., James v. United States, 
366 U.S. 213 (1961); Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952); United States v. Sullivan, 
274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927) (mere fact that a business engages in a transaction that is unlawful 
does not "exempt it from paying taxes that if lawful it would have to pay"); United States v. 
Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477,480 (1923); United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U.S. 450 (1921); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.61-14 (1960). 
34. If two taxpayers are alike in all respects except that one taxpayer's income is earned 
from an unlawful source and is accrued in a later tax year, their treatment for tax purposes will 
be unequal. First, the unlawful entity's income may rise or fall in subsequen! years, so that 
including the income in a later year may mean that it is taxed at a different marginal rate. 
WEST'S FEDERAL TAXATION: INDMDUAL INCOME TAXES 73 (1979 ed.). Second, even if the 
marginal tax rates were identical, the taxpayer would still benefit from the time value of 
money. See w. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 206-10 (2d ed. 1979); B. BITT-
KER & L. STONE, supra note 3, at 1007. 
35. See J. SKOLNICK, House OF CARDS 80-81 (1978). While all "illegalities" are ''unlaw-
ful," the converse is not true. 
[l]n the proper sense of the word, ''unlawful," as applied to promises, agreements, consid-
erations, and the like, denotes that they are ineffectual in law because they involve acts 
which, although not ille~al, i.e., positively forbidden, are disapproved of by the law, and 
are therefore not recogmzed as tlie ground oflegal rights, either because they are immoral 
or because they are against public policy. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1705 (4th ed. 1951) (citations omitted). See note 11 supra. 
36. Holland, Accrual Problems in Tax Accounting, 48 MICH. L. Rev. 149, 154 (1949). 
37. 281 U.S. 11, 13 (1950) (applying§ 13(d) of the 1916 Revenue Act which is similar to 
§ 446). See Freeman, Tax Accrual Accountingfar Contested Items, 56 MICH. L. Rev. 727, 734 
(1958). 
38. Normally, in the income area, the IRS is more concerned with requiring inclusion of 
items received, although not yet earned. See, e.g., Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 
(1963); American Auto. Assn. v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961). See also McClure, .Diverse 
Tax Interpretations of Accounting Concepts, J. ACCOUNTING, Oct. 1976, at 67, 68. 
39. 269 U.S. 422 (1926). 
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only proper deductions were taken from gross income. 40 
While :financial accounting relies on estimates in calculating ex-
penses, it turns to certainties in accruing income. As commentators 
have noted, income that is certain enough for :financial accrual is 
sufficiently certain to satisfy the IRS's standard for tax accrual,41 ex-
cept in the rare case where a taxpayer such as the North Texas Lum-
ber Co. may evade tax liability by accruing income in the earlier 
year.42 The adequacy of :financial accounting's standard for accrual 
of income justifies distinguishing North Texas Lumber from cases -
including those concerning gambling markers - in which accrual 
does not facilitate tax evasion.43 Where the objectives of :financial 
and tax accounting converge, Congress required that income be re-
ported in the tax year in which it is accounted for under the tax-
payer's method of :financial accounting.44 
40. Subsequent decisions relaxed the strict requirement of North Texas Lumber, never 
again using the term ''unconditional" to describe the ''right" to income. See Commissioner v. 
Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 464 (1959) ("[I]t is the time of acquisition of the fixed right lo receive the 
reserves and not the time of their actual receipt") (emphasis in original); United States v. 
Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 93 (1936) ("contested and uncertain"); North 
Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 423 (1932) (''not required •.. to report as income an 
amount which it might never receive"); Continental Tie & Lumber Co. v. United States, 286 
U.S. 290, 295 (1932) ("right to payment"). The Court, however, continued to show concern for 
certainty. See, e.g., Estate of Putnam v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 393,400 (1945) ("Such uncer-
tainty destroys any conception of accrual as involving a right to receive or an obligation to pay, 
elements which we think are essential for accrual under our decisions.") (footnote omitted). 
41. See generally Kupfer, mpra note 4; Simonette, A Challenge: Can the Accounting Profes-
sion Lead the Tax System?, J. ACCOUNTING, Sept. 1968, at 66. Normally, the IRS will not 
question a taxpayer's decision to report income in its tax return. See Raby & Richter, Con-
formity of Tax and Financial Accounting, J. ACCOUNTING, Mar. 1975, at 42, 43-44. 
Although adopting the Anderson test in the income situation maximized tax revenues in the 
North Texas Lumber case, it will not always work to the Commissioner's advantage. See 
United States v. Consolidated Edison Co., 366 U.S. 380, 385 (1961); Tandy Corp. v. United 
States, 626 F.2d 1186, 1195 (5th Cir. 1980). This is because the use of the "all events test" in 
the income situations has two effects: a taxpayer cannot report uncertain income, nor can the 
IRS require him to do so. Uncertain income must always be deferred even if the taxpayer has 
accrued the amounts on its financial statements. See Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 321 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1944). 
42. If a taxpayer expects its income to rise substantially in subsequent years, it may avoid 
the commensurately higher marginal tax rates by reporting uncertain income in the current tax 
year, thus reducing its aggregate tax liability. A taxpayer may also seek early accrual of in-
come if Congress passes a tax rate increase. 
43. Postponing accrual of gambling markers will in fact facilitate tax evasion. See note 94 
in.fro and accompanying text. 
44. See notes 1-5 mpra and accompanying text. 
While complete conformity of tax and financial accounting neither exists nor is feasible, 
conformity does benefit taxpayers, the IRS, and the general public by reducing ''the effort and 
cost of tax compliance and administration, and ... [the] confusion in financial reporting." 
Statement on Conformity of Tax and Financial Accounting Adopted by the Board of JJireclors of 
the American Institute of Cert!fied Public Accountants, reprinted in B. BITTKER & L. STONE, 
mpra note 3, at 1013-14. This, in tum, leads to "greater confidence in the fairness and integ-
rity of the tax." Tlte Report of the President's Task Force on Business Taxation (Sept. 1970), 
reprinted in B. BITTKER & L. STONE, mpra note 3, at 1013. Since financial accounting tends to 
understate income, see note 3 mpra, and since the I.R.C. should be construed to "reconcile 
business and tax treatment of an item, rather than driving them further apart," Eastman Ko-
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An analysis of tax policy, therefore, reads section 451 not to re-
quire legal enforceability of an outstanding debt for accrual. Careful 
examination of the cases discussing income accrual is corroborative: 
Legal enforceability is accorded some weight but is never disposi-
tive.45 The courts instead focus on the certainty, at the time a debt is 
executed,46 that it will eventually be collected.47 
"In.Barker v. Magruder,48 the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit held that a lender must include in income interest 
on a note that it had accrued on its books, even though the interest 
receivable was unenforceable because it violated the state's usury 
laws.49 The court stated that whether an item is accruable "depends 
not so much . . . upon the legal right to enforce collection as upon 
the existing probability of its being received."50 The same interests 
may have owned and controlled the debtor and taxpayer,51 assuring 
payment of the obligation. The debts were secured,52 and payments 
had been regularly made in the past.53 The claim was therefore cer-
tain despite its unenforceability.54 
dak Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 252, 258 (Ct. Cl. 1976), there is no compelling reason to 
postpone inclusion of the outstanding markers in income. 
45. See 2 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 12.62 (rev. ed. 1974). 
46. See Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Campbell, 181 F.2d 451, 470-71 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
340 U.S. 850 (1950) ("Vague possibilities that income may have to be returned or that it may 
possibly be subject to diminution or offset will not alone suffice to postpone accrual and report-
ing of taxable income"); Dingle-Clark Co. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 782, 791 (1956) (Theoreti-
cally possible events, not realistic in light of known facts, should not postpone the accrual of 
income which is established with reasonable certainty bo?1 as to liability and amount). 
47. See San Francisco Stevedoring Co. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 222, 225-26 (1947); 2 J. 
MERTENS, supra note 45, at § 12.60. The correct application of this test is often cumbersome 
because its result turns on questions of degree. See id at § 12.62. 
48. 95 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1938). 
49. 95 F.2d at 125. Arguably, the court was concerned only with preventing the taxpayer 
from profiting from his own wrongdoing, but this is not the purpose of the tax laws. The 
federal income tax "is a tax on net income, not a sanction against wrongdoing." Commis-
sioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966). In any event, a gambling casino does not violate 
any laws by extending credit to its patrons. Although this-Nate- ceneurs in the conclusion of 
the federal district court in Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States, 485 F. Supp. 926 (D. Nev. 
1980), one of the court's major premises was that a taxpayer should not profit from his own 
wrongdoing. 485 F. Supp. at 938. This premise is neither proper nor persuasive under the 
federal income tax laws. 
SO. 95 F.2d at 123. 
51. 95 F.2d at 123. See Holland, supra note 36, at 158. This relationship presented the 
opportunity for manipulation of income recognition so as to avoid or defer taxation. 
52. 95 F.2d at 124. 
53. 95 F.2d at 125. 
54. See Holland, supra note 36, at 158. See also Barker v. United States, 26 F. Supp. 1004 
(Ct. Cl. 1939) (almost identical to, involved the same lender, and reached the same result as 
Barker v. Magruder). 
Similarly, in Herberger v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 546,549 (1950), qffd, 195 F.2d 
293 (9th Cir. 1952), the Tax Court required the taxpayer to include in income an amount due 
that was not legally enforceable because it was in excess of government price ceilings. The 
court stated that illegality does not entitle a taxpayer to postpone accrual. Great emphasis was 
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The Sixth Circuit followed Barker in Travis v. Commissioner,55 
ordering a dance studio, which had not yet performed services re-
quired by student enrollment agreements, to include installment 
payments due as income. 56 The taxpayer argued that the receivables 
were not accruable because, under the governing state law, they rep-
resented legally unenforceable executory contracts.57 The court, 
however, found that the certainty of eventual payments outweighed 
the contracts' unenforceability.58 It concluded that the language of 
the student enrollment agreements had convinced patrons that they 
were bound by the contract's payment terms59 since the students 
paid many installments and the taxpayer rarely resorted to litiga-
tion. 60 In addition, delivery of the dance lessons would have enabled 
the studio to enforce its contract rights under state law. 61 The court 
thus viewed the case "in light of realism and practicality"62 to find 
the claims sufficiently certain to require accrual.63 
Some cases purport to require legal enforceability in permitting 
taxpayers to postpone inclusion, but on closer examination they re-
veal that the amounts due were too uncertain to be accrued. In Cuba 
placed on the fact that there was no dispute as to liability, nor fear on the taxpayer's part that 
he might not be paid. The debt was, in fact, paid at the beginning of the following year. 
55. 406 F.2d 987, 990 (6th Cir. 1969). • 
56. 406 F.2d at 990. 
57. 406 F.2d at 989. 
58. 406 F.2d at 990. 
59. 406 F.2d at 990. 
60. 406 F.2d at 990. 
61. Though the court did not discuss this fact, the taxpayer's capability of manipulating 
income recognition was identical to that presented in Barker v. Magruder, 95 F.2d 122 (D.C. 
Cir. 1938). See notes 48-54 supra and accompanying text. 
62. 406 F.2d at 990 (citing Commissioner v. Segall, 114 F.2d 706, 709 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. 
denied, 313 U.S. 562 (1941)). 
63. 406 F.2d at 990. 
In Gar Wood Indus., Inc. v. United States, 437 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1971), the Sixth Circuit 
used language that could be interpreted as overruling Travis, although the latter case was not 
specifically mentioned. In Gar Wood, the accrual-basis taxpayer entered into contracts with 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that provided for periodic payments for work in progress. 
In violation of the contract provisions, the Corps withheld amounts due the taxpayer pending 
redetermination and renegotiation of the contract prices. The IRS sought to require accrual of 
the withheld sums. In refusing to require accrual, the court stated that a taxpayer must have a 
"fixed, determined, and enforceable right" to receive the amounts before accrual is proper. 
437 F.2d at 560. The taxpayer may, in fact, have had a legally enforceable right to some 
payment. The court's determination, however, hinged on uncertainties as to the amount in-
volved: the parties had undergone renegotiation and were unable to agree on a redetermined 
price. The court may have based its holding, therefore, not on the enforceability issue, but on 
the requirement of the "all events test" that the "amount . • • be determined with reasonable 
accuracy." This is entirely consistent with the Travis rule that a claim must be sufficiently 
certain to require accrual. 
In Case v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1939), the court held that an accrual basis 
taxpayer need not include in income gain realized yet not received on an exchange of stock. 
Even though he had an enforceable contract, the gain was not sufficiently certain until actually 
received three years later because of a dispute concerning the value of the underlying assets, 
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Railroad v. Commissioner,64 the taxpayer had performed transporta-
tion services for the Cuban government, for which the latter admit-
ted liability.65 The taxpayer could have obtained a judgment against 
the government in Cuban courts,66 but Cuban law limited collection 
to the extent of the budget, 67 and the Cuban legislature refused to 
appropriate an amount sufficient for payment:68 In spite of its con-
cern for legal enforceability, 69 the court based its decision not requir-
ing inclusion 70 on the "great uncertainty as to when and whether the 
Cuban government would pay the amount."71 Similarly, in Mary-
land Shipbuilding & .Drydock Co. v. United States,12 the Court of 
Claims did not require the taxpayer to include insurance proceeds in 
the year that it sustained a loss. While the court stated that to accrue 
income a taxpayer must have an "enforceable" right, 73 its argument 
relied on the payment's uncertainty:7~ Liability was disputed,75 and 
the amount of recovery was undetermined and subject to 
negotiation. 76 
When determining whether an item is sufficiently certain to ac-
crue as income, the courts thus focus on a number of factors besides 
legal enforceability, including (1) the existence and completeness of 
any written agreement between the parties,77 (2) the ease of collec-
tion and the collection rate on the receivables,78 (3) the frequency of 
64. 9 T.C. 211 (1947). 
65. 9 T.C. at 214. 
66. 9 T.C. at 214. 
67. 9 T.C. at 214. 
68. 9 T.C. at 212-13. 
69. 9 T.C. at 215. 
70. 9 T.C. at 215. 
71. 9 T.C. at 215. See also Breeze Corps. v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 404 (Ct. Cl. 1954). 
There, the Court of Claims held that the taxpayer was entitled to a refund because it had 
erroneously included in income the estimated receipt expected on a war contract cancellation 
claim. The court stated that accrual required an enforceable right, yet there was great uncer-
tainty as to the amount of and liability for the claim. The evidence included voluminous 
correspondence, many proposed partial settlement agreements, a complete denial of the claim 
at one time, several years of negotiation, and final settlement for only one third of the claim. 
117 F. Supp. at 405-06. 
72. 409 F.2d 1363 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (per curiam). 
73. 409 F.2d at 1366 (quoting Breeze Corps. v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 404,407 (Ct. Cl. 
1954)). 
74. 409 F.2d at 1369. 
75. The insurer never made an unqualified admission of liability in the year of loss. 409 
F.2d at 1369. The taxpayer's loss was covered by multiple policies. The insurer conditioned 
payment of the total loss under one policy on the taxpayer's agreeing to waiverecovery under 
other policies. 409 F.2d at 1367. 
76. 409 F.2d at 1369. The court was also satisfied that the taxpayer had not attempted to 
influence or manipulate the timing of the settlement agreement. 409 F.2d at 1369. 
11. See Travis v. Commissioner, 406 F.2d 987, 990 & n.3 (6th Cir. 1969). 
78. See 406 F.2d at 990. The Ninth Circuit articulated what was later interpreted to be an 
exception to the "all events test": "[N]o income accrues unless there is a reasonable expec-
tancy that the right will be converted into money or its equivalent." H. Liebes & Co. v. Com-
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litigation involving the receivables,79 (4) the opportunity for manip-
ulation of income recognition in order to avoid taxation,80 (5) the 
treatment of the item for financial reporting purposes,81 (6) the 
existence of any contingencies to the receipt of payment, 82 and 
(7) the existence of any dispute as to the debtor's liability.83 
When applied to unenforceable gambling debts, these criteria re-
quire accrual in the year the markers are executed. The markers that 
a credit customer executes represent not only negotiable counter-
checks for the amount of the chips transferred to him, 84 but also the 
existence of a debtor-creditor relationship with the casino.85 The ca-
sino performs a thorough credit check and then extends a maximum 
line of credit that it expects to collect. 86 Most credit patrons settle 
liabilities after concluding play.87 Unsatisfied markers are classified 
as accounts receivable88 and are ordinarily collected through normal 
missioner, 90 F.2d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 1937). See Clifton Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 
290, 292 (4th Cir. 1943); Franklin County Distilling Co. v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 800, 805 
(6th Cir. 1942) (following the rule in Liebes). The rule, however, is consistent with an interpre-
tation of the "all events test" requiring sufficient certainty. See, e.g., Stephens Marine, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 430 F.2d 679, 684 (9th Cir. 1970) (requiring substantial uncertainty or a contin-
gency for the rule to apply). Cf. Jones Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 404 F.2d 764, 766-67 (6th 
Cir. 1968) (requiring debtor's financial instability or insolvency for the rule to apply). 
79. See Travis v. Commissioner, 406 F.2d 987, 990 (6th Cir. 1969). 
80. See Travis v. Commissioner, 406 F.2d 987 (6th Cir. 1969); Case v. Commissioner, 103 
F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1939); Barker v. Magruder, 95 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Maryland Ship-
building & Drydock Co. v. United States, 409 F.2d 1363, 1369 (Ct. Cl. 1969). Cf. Commis-
sioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 467 (1959) (''To permit accrual basis taxpayers to escape 
accrual and taxation, in a particular year, of such portions 9f their sales as they may permit to 
be retained by buyers ... might well afford opportunities to accrual basis taxpayers to allo-
cate income to years deemed most advantageous."). 
81. See Barker v. Magruder, 95 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1938). Given financial accounting's 
conservatism in reporting income, an item's financial treatment is a good indication of its 
certainty. See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text. If, however, other factors point to 
uncertainty, the taxpayer's accrual of the amount in his financial statements is not controlling. 
See note 41 supra. 
82. See Maryland Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. United States, 409 F.2d 1363, 1369 (Ct. 
Cl. 1969); Cuba R.R. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 211, 214-15 (1947). 
83. See Gar Wood Indus., Inc. v. United States, 437 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1971); Case v. 
Commissioner, 103 F.2d 283, 287-88 (9th Cir. 1939); Maryland Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. 
United States, 409 F.2d 1363, 1369 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Breeze Corps. v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 
404,410 (Ct. Cl. 1954); Herberger v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.M. (CCH) 546, 549 (1950), ajfd., 
195 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1952). 
84. See note 8 supra. 
85. The existence of a debtor-creditor relationship is a conclusion of law. It is supported 
by the circumstances examined in the text at notes 86-94 i'!fra. 
86. Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States, 485 F. Supp. 926, 928 (D. Nev. 1980); Desert 
Palace, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1033, 1038 (1979). Approximately 20% of the revenue 
generated by gambling is in the form of outstanding markers. See 485 F. Supp. at 928; 72 T.C. 
at 1036. 
87. 485 F. Supp. at 928; 72 T.C. at 1039. 
88. See 72 T.C. at 1042-43. The casinos charge no interest on these receivables, nor are 
they secured in any way. See 72 T.C. at 1041. 
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banking channels89 or after extensive collection efforts.90 On the 
rare occasions when the casino resorts to litigation,91 it often obtains 
judgment against debtors who fail to assert the "gambling purposes" 
defense.92 With these efforts, casinos eventually collect ninety-five 
percent of the outstanding markers.93 Failure of the courts to re-
quire accrual may facilitate tax evasion; the casino may then manip-
ulate its taxable income by postponing payment due dates or 
decreasing collection efforts.94 Moreover, the casino includes the 
markers as gross income in its financial statements.95 Unless a par-
ticular credit patron makes payment of his debt contingent or dis-
putes his liability, eventual payment of a gambling debt will be 
sufficiently certain to require accrual in the year it is executed. 
II. THE BAD DEBT RESERVE 
The accrual of outstanding gambling markers as taxable income 
in the year of execution raises the possibility of taxing income that 
the taxpayer may never receive.96 To tax only the income actually 
received, section 166( c) of the Internal Revenue Code allows a de-
duction "for a reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts."97 Al-· 
though accrual-basis taxpayers usually reflect doubt about income 
receipt by taking such a deduction, and the Commissioner has al-
lowed a reserve in one of the two gambling marker cases,98 a treas-
ury regulation may require legal enforceability before a taxpayer 
may take a bad debt deduction using the reserve method. Regula-
tion 1.166-l(c) interprets the Code only to permit deduction of a 
89. See 485 F. Supp. at 928-29; 72 T.C. at 1042. 
90. Casino personnel will typically contact the debtor by telephone or in person on one or 
more occasions. If this fails, the casino will usually refer the claim to an attorney or collection 
agency. Court action is commenced as a last resort. See 12 T.C. at 1043. 
91. See note 90supra. There is no apparent dispute concerning the debtor's liability at the 
time the markers are executed. 485 F. Supp. at 934. 
92. See 12 T.C. at 1043. The legal unenforceability of the markers does not make them so 
speculative as to prevent accrual. Although legal unenforceability creates the theoretical possi-
bility that the income ultimately )Vill not be received, it has virtually no effect on the casino's 
collection rate. 
93. See 485 F. Supp. at 928; 72 T.C. at 1042. 
94. Currently, the casino permits a patron to satisfy his or her marker with a check post-
dated beyond the close of the taxable period. See 485 F. Supp. at 929; 72 T.C. at 1043. If the 
casino wished to defer recognition, it could easily arrange with patrons to make actual pay-
ment at the later time it desires. ' 
95. See 485 F. Supp. at 929; 72 T.C. at 1044. 
96. The casinos can expect not to collect 5% of the outstanding markers. See note 93 supra. 
Yet, having been reported as income on an accrual basis, this income will be subject to tax. 
97. I.R.C. § 166{c). This is the normal manner of reflecting doubt about income receipt. 
See J. MERTENS, supra note 45, at § 12.75. 
98. Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States, 485 F. Supp. 926, 938 (D. Nev. 1980). In De-
sert Palace, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1033 (1979), the Commissioner allowed a bad debt 
deduction under§ 166(a), 72 T.C. at 1034, but may have disputed a deduction under§ 166(c) 
for an addition to the taxpayer's bad debt reserve. 72 T.C. at 1034 n.2. 
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"bona fide" debt, which it defines as one that "arises from a debtor-
creditor relationship based on a valid and enforceable obligation to 
pay a fixed or determinable sum of money."99 Courts might also 
deny bad debt deductions if they believe that they frustrate a public 
policy against extending credit for gambling purposes.100 This Sec-
tion of the Note argues that the IRS must allow the casinos to estab-
lish a bad debt reserve because the regulation requiring an 
"enforceable obligation" can be plausibly interpreted only to pre-
clude deductions where no bona fide debt has in fact been incurred. 
This interpretation would also promote the tax policy against taxing 
income that the taxpayer has never received without undermining 
the public policy of Nevada. 
A proper interpretation of regulation 1.166-l(c) begins at its ori-
gin: the legislative history of section 166. Congress conditioned the 
applicability of that provision on "the existence of a bona fide debt 
as distinguished from a gift or a contribution to the capital of the 
corporation."101 In each of the latter cases, no debtor-creditor rela-
tionship_ arises because the party receiving the money is not obli-
gated to return it to the taxpayer. 102 As a result, the taxpayer cannot 
claim to have suffered a loss for which a deduction should be al-
lowed. For this reason, cases preceding the regulation103 and the 
regulation itself104 distinguish debts from gifts and capital con-
tributions. The courts and the IRS have only used the bona fide debt 
standard where, because of uncertainty, 105 the existence of a debt 
was in issue.106 
99. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-l(c) (1959). 
100. See notes 124-25 i'!fra and accompanying text. 
101. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22, A47-A48, reprinted in [1954] U.S. 
CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 4017, 4184; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25, 199-200, 
reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4834-35. Congress used this language to 
distinguish debts from gifts and capital outlays. 
Treasury Regulations, if not unreasonable or inconsistent with express statutory provisions, 
have the force and effect of the law and will not be overruled except for substantial reasons. 
See Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948); Maryland Cas. Co. v. 
United States, 251 U.S. 342, 349 (1920); Latham Park Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 
199, 211-12 (1977). 
102. See Treas. Reg.§ 1.166-l(c) (1959). 
103. See, e.g., W.F. Young, Inc. v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 159 (1st Cir. 1941) (gift); Ku-
bitzki v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 1182 (1952) (gift); Houston Chronicle Publishing 
Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 1233 (1944) (gift); Jacob Grossman, 9 B.T.A. 643 (1927) (gift). 
104. Treas. Reg.§ 1.166-l(c) (1959). The language immediately follows the bona fide debt 
definition. 
105. See Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 542-43 (1979). 
106. The early cases focused on whether a debt existed. See, e.g., Cullinan v. Commis-
sioner, 19 B.T.A. 930 (1930) (loan to political campaign committee); Missouri Valley Bridge & 
Iron Co. v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 1162 (1929) (lost suit on construction contract); Federal 
Fuel Co., 3 B.T.A. 814 (1926) (forfeited performance deposit is not a debt); Louis Titus, 2 
B.T.A. 754 (1925) (no authority to contract); Luke & Fleming, Inc., I B.T.A. 12 (1924) (insur-
ance policy). 
Only one case, Domhoff & Joyce Co. v. Commissioner, 17 B.T.A. 1015 (1929), q/fd., 50 
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The foregoing analysis suggests that regulation 1.166-l(c) does 
not contemplate the unenforceable markers held by casinos. Such 
loans are made with the belief that they will be repaid, and they are 
accrued as income.107 Unlike gifts and capital contributions, there-
fore, gambling loans create a true debtor-creditor relationship, 108 
and casinos face the prospect of a loss for each marker that they-do 
not collect. Because of these differences, the regulation's enforce-
ability requirement should be interpreted to apply only to gifts and 
capital contributions, and not to accrued income.109 
Interpreting the regulation to deny a reserve for bad gambling 
debts also risks taxation of income that the casino has never re-
ceived. While such a result would undermine fundamental tax pol-
icy, 110 opponents of the bad debt reserve might rely on Herbert E. 
Tharp, lll which denied a bad debt deduction but allowed a section 
165 loss deduction. Tharp was an accrual method taxpayer whose 
loans, made at usurious interest rates, w_ere unenforceable under 
state law.112 According to the court, the loans, as unenforceable 
claims, did not qualify as debts for which the taxpayer could take a 
section 166 deduction. 113 The court, however, allowed the loss de-
duction because it recognized the inequity of taxing accrued income 
that the taxpayer would never receive: "To deny a deduction in this 
case would come close to making this business taxable on the basis 
of gross receipts, while all other businesses would be taxable on the 
basis of net income."114 
A loss deduction would mitigate the inequity of taxing bad gam-
bling debts, but it would not eliminate it. Unlike bad debts, 115 losses 
cannot be deducted on the reserve method. 116 As the regulations in-
dicate, a loss must be "evidenced by closed and completed transac-
tions, fixed by identifiable events, and . . . actually sustained during 
F.2d 893 (1931), involved an accrual basis taxpayer and accrued accounts receivable. In that 
case, however, the taxpayer received the amount due from a third party. This receipt was 
nontaxable. Permitting a bad debt deduction would have given the taxpayer a double benefit. 
107. See notes 84-95 supra and accompanying text. 
108. See note 85 supra and accompanying text. 
109. Cf. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v. United States, 513 F.2d 1342 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (Treasury 
Regulation interpreted so as to be consistent with statutory purpose). 
110. Income that will not be received cannot be taxed. See North Am. Oil Consol. v. 
Burnet, 286 U.S. 417,423 (1932); Long Poultry Farms v. Commissioner, 249 F.2d 726, 731 (4th 
Cir. 1957); Farrell v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 193; 194 (5th Cir. 1943). It would be inequitable 
to tax income when there is no reasonable expectancy of its receipt. Com Exch. Bank v. 
United States, 37 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1930). 
111. 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 22 (1972). 
112. 31 T.C.M. at 24-25. 
113. 31 T.C.M. at 25. 
114. 31 T.C.M. at 26. 
115. I.R.C. § 166(c). 
116. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-l(d) (1960). 
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the taxable year'' to be deductible. 117 Losses, moreover, must be 
wholly worthless before deducted; 118 bad debts may be deducted 
when partially so.119 These differences permit a taxpayer taking the 
bad debt deduction on the reserve method to recover tax paid on 
income never received sooner than a taxpayer taking the loss deduc-
tion, who loses the time value of money.120 To deny the casino the 
full benefit of a bad debt reserve and afford it to other businesses 
would, therefore, violate the principle that "similarly situated tax-
payers [should] pay the same tax."121 Although denial of a bad debt 
deduction may have been justifiable in Tharp where the transactions 
were proscribed by statute, courts should afford the full benefit of the 
bad debt reserve to casinos who comply with the law in extending 
credit to gamblers.122 
Opponents of the bad debt reserve might also deny the deduction 
because it frustrates Nevada's public policy against gambling on 
credit.123 The Supreme Court has denied federal income tax deduc-
tions that would severely and immediately124 undermine a clearly 
articulated national or state policy;125 however, allowing the bad 
117. Treas. Reg.§ 1.165-l(b) (1960). 
118. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-l(a) (1960). 
119. I.R.C. § 166(a)(2). 
120. The Supreme Court recognized this inequity in Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 
27 (1958). The Court held expenditures, themselves illegal, deductible in computing taxable 
income of an illegal gambling enterprise. The Court stated that disallowing the deductions 
would come close to making the business taxable on its gross receipts, whereas other businesses 
are taxed on net income. 356 U.S. at 29. While a 1971 congressional amendment to I.R.C. 
§ 162(c)(2) may have overturned Sullivan, the case's reasoning and policy still apply to gam-
bling markers. See Herbert E. Tharp v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 22, 23 & n.5 (1972) 
(concluding that the public policy prohibition is precluded by§ 162(c) as to loss deductions but 
not bad debt deductions); Note, The Judicial Public Policy .Doctrine in Tax Litigation, 74 MICH, 
L. REV. 131 (1975). 
The case of uncollectible gambling markers provides even more sympathetic facts for al-
lowing the deduction than Sullivan. First, although the gambling markers are unenforceable, 
they are not illegal. Second, whereas the business in the Sullivan case was itself illegal, the 
casino is conducting a legal enterprise under the laws of Nevada. Its credit extensions are 
authorized by Nevada law and regulated by the Nevada Gaming Commission and the Nevada 
Gaming Control Board. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1033, 1036-37 
(1979). Third, taxing nonexistent income is far different from not allowing expenses to be 
deducted from income admittedly received. Whereas an expense deduction is considered a 
matter of legislative grace, see Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 693 (1966); Deputy v. 
Dupont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940), a tax on income that is not received is clearly contrary to tax 
policy. See North Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417,423 (1932); Long Poultry Farms v. 
Commissioner, 249 F.2d 726, 731 (4th Cir. 1957); Farrell v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 193, 194 
(5th Cir. 1943). 
121. See note 34 supra. 
122. See note 120 supra. 
123. See J. SKOLNICK, supra note 35; note 11 supra. 
124. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958). 
125. The Court requires a governmental declaration proscribing particular forms of con-
duct Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 694 (1966). See, e.g., Smith v. Commissioner, 34 
T.C. 1100 (1960), q/fd., 294 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1961) (denial of bad debt deduction on public 
policy grounds); Wagner v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 1099 (1934) (denial of loss deduction 
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debt reserve would not severely or immediately frustrate Nevada's 
policy against gambling on credit. The state's courts have effectu-
ated the policy by holding the markers void. 126 Allowing the reserve 
does not lessen the penalty's "sting"127 since casino profits will still 
fall to the extent of the penalty.128 Disallowing the reserve would 
add a penalty129 that is contrary to a goal of tax law: taxing net 
rather than gross income.130 Absent a severe and immediate frustra-
tion of the state's policy, the courts must allow a bad debt reserve 
for accrued markers that may subsequently prove worthless. 131 
CONCLUSION 
That gambling markers are not legally enforceable does not nec-
essarily mean that they should not be included in taxable income by 
an accrual method taxpayer; rather, courts must evaluate all the rele-
vant facts and circumstances at the time the debt is executed to de-
termine its certainty. Ordinarily the casino markers are sufficiently 
certain to be accrued as taxable income. 
Taxing accrued markers that subsequently prove worthless cre-
ates an inequity that courts can eliminate by allowing a reserve for 
bad debts. Treasury regulations, however, do not allow a bad debt 
reserve when the underlying claim is unenforceable. This Note dem-
onstrates that when an item is accrued in taxable income, tax policy 
requires granting a corresponding reserve for bad debts. Thus, 
courts that require casinos to accrue their income from the outstand-
ing markers should also allow a bad debt reserve. 
arising from operation of usurious loan business). This rule is an exception to the principle 
that the income tax does not punish wrongdoing. 383 U.S. at 691-94. Ordinarily, deductions 
are not limited to expenses or losses incurred in a legitimate or lawful trade or business. 383 
U.S. at 691. 
126. See note 11 supra. 
127. See generally Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. at 35-36 (1958). 
128. A tax deduction will not offset the amount of the penalty. It will only prevent imposi-
tion of an additional penalty equal to the amount of tax paid on income not received. 
129. If the reserve is not allowed, the taxpayer is in effect taxed on its income before de-
ductions, i.e., on "gross" income. In this way, tax law will treat the casino different from other 
accrual basis taxpayers who are permitted a reserve for bad debts. Such a result is contrary to 
the tax policy that similarly situated taxpayers be treated alike even if one is conducting a 
lawful business and the other an unlawful one. See Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 
439 U.S. 522, 544 (1979). 
130. See note 120 supra; Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691-92 (1966). 
Arguably, the public policy prohibition has been precluded by amendments to § 162. 
I.R.C. § 162(c). The Tax Court, based on the IRS's concession, has concluded that the preclu-
sion applies to loss deductions. See note 120 supra. There are no cases applying the same 
rationale to bad debt deductions. 
131. The court in Travis v. Commissioner, 406 F.2d 987, 991 (6th Cir. 1969), stated that if a 
taxpayer is required to include a receivable in income, it is entitled to a realistic bad debt 
reserve. The court did not explain its holding, assuming such an entitlement and applying the 
"realistic" concept to the facts of the case before iL 
